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Abstract:  
We use a unique, geocoded micro data set of retail prices to estimate the 
incidence of alcohol taxation. We estimate the pass-through of alcohol 
taxation employing both standard ordinary least squares (OLS) and a 
regression discontinuity design (RDD), using the abrupt change in excise tax 
occurring at state borders for identification. Our results show that sales and 
excise taxes on alcohol have different effects on final consumer price. Our 
estimates suggest that while 40 percent to 50 percent of sales taxes are 
passed on to consumers, excise taxes have a negative pass-through rate. 
Negative rates of pass-through on the excise portion of the alcohol tax are 
likely the result of consumers overreacting to the tax compared to how they 
would react to a general price increase, or that the alcohol tax is quite salient 
for consumers. This effect is particularly strong in areas near state borders 
when using the RDD estimation strategy. 
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Alcohol consumption is linked to a variety of negative 
externalities including traffic fatalities, domestic violence, health 
expenditures, and crime (Biderman, de Mello, and Schneider 2010; 
Carpenter 2007; Chaloupka, Grossman, and Saffer 2002; Cutler 2002; 
Lovenheim and Slemrod 2010; Markowitz and Grossman 2000; Ruhm 
1996). In principle, alcohol taxes, which generate over US$15 billion 
per year in revenue for federal, state, and local governments, work to 
mitigate the external effects of alcohol consumption, and reduce these 
negative externalities. In practice, however, the reduction in alcohol 
consumption that results from these taxes depends on the economic 
incidence and salience of them. 
There is a wide range of alcohol tax incidence estimates, with 
some studies showing that alcohol taxes are undershifted onto 
consumers (i.e., the price passed onto consumers goes up by less than 
the amount of the tax) and others suggesting that prices increase by 
as much as four times the amount of the tax (Barzel 1976; Carbonnier 
2013; Kenkel 2005; Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz 2002); see 
Dutkowsky and Sullivan (2014) for a review of this literature.1 There is 
also a growing literature on tax salience (Chetty 2009; Chetty, Looney, 
and Kroft 2009; Finkelstein 2009; Hayashi, Nakamura, and Gamage 
2013), but this work still remains sparse relative to the incidence 
literature.  
We add to these literatures by estimating the incidence and 
salience of alcohol taxation using both standard ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and regression discontinuity design (RDD) estimation strategies. 
Both techniques rely on state-level variation in alcohol taxation but 
have different identifying assumptions. The RDD is particularly 
advantageous in this case, as it examines a narrow area around state 
borders where other factors correlated with alcohol prices are less 
likely to change than they are when considering an entire state. We 
are able to apply the RDD because of our unique geocoded data set of 
alcohol prices for retailers in the southeastern United States. We also 
examine how the difference in the salience of different alcohol taxes 
may potentially affect the interpretation of our results and incidence in 
general. Alcohol taxation is ideal in this regard, because it is subject to 
a tax that is included in the posted price (the excise portion, which 
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should be more salient) and a tax that is added at the cash register 
(the sales tax, which should be less salient). 
OLS estimates suggest that, depending on the product and 
specification, the combined (excise and sales tax) alcohol tax is only 
partially passed on to consumers at a rate of between 11 percent and 
53 percent. Estimates separating the sales and excise tax show that 
between 40 percent and 45 percent of sales taxes are passed on to 
consumers, while excise taxes actually have negative pass-through 
rates of between 11 percent and 15 percent. The RDD estimates show 
an even sharper rate of negative pass-through to consumers, in many 
cases larger than 100 percent of the excise tax. We surmise that the 
negative incidence estimates are due to the salience of alcohol excise 
taxes. Previous research has shown that consumers are more attentive 
to excise taxes, which are included in the sticker price of the product, 
so they should be less easily passed on to consumers. These results 
imply that consumers ‘‘overreact’’ (or are extremely sensitive) to 
excise taxes on alcohol compared to the reduction in demand that 
occurs from a general price increase.  
While both sets of results suggest negative pass-through of 
alcohol excise taxes, we are particularly confident in the RDD 
estimates as the assumption that no drastic changes at state borders 
(other than alcohol tax) holds up to additional testing. These results 
are robust to a variety of specifications including changing the 
bandwidth around borders, adding control variables, and the type of 
control function. 
Empirical Models 
We examine the incidence of alcohol taxation by gathering data 
on the excise tax inclusive price and state and local sales tax rates of 
nationally recognized products from retail outlets in the southeastern 
United States (all locations require product to be consumed off-site). 
We collect data on the price of two standard products—a six-pack of 
Bud Light beer and a six- pack of Miller Lite beer.2 Throughout the 
article, we refer to the excise tax on alcohol as the tax placed on 
alcohol that is included in the posted price of a product and to the 
sales tax as the tax placed on alcohol at the sales counter; added 
together, they are the total tax on alcohol. Our strategy is to examine 
if and by how much the tax inclusive price of these products changes 
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as the size of the excise and sales taxes changes across state, county, 
and municipal boundaries. 
We chose the southeastern United States to study alcohol tax 
incidence primarily because of the variation in the excise tax on 
alcohol across states in this region. The area we study covers four 
states—Tennessee (TN), Georgia (GA), Alabama (AL), and Florida (FL). 
The excise tax per six-pack of beer is highest in TN at US$0.84. AL 
(US$0.59) and GA (US$0.57) have lower rates, and FL has the lowest 
excise tax of the four states at US$0.27. The sales tax on a six-pack of 
beer varies by the statutory rate and the posted price of product but is 
also notably different across states in our area of study. Average sales 
tax on a six-pack of beer in TN, AL, GA, and FL are US$0.57, US$0.55, 
US$0.42, and US$0.43, respectively.3 
We implement two estimation strategies to explore the 
incidence of alcohol taxation: OLS and RDD. Each technique relies on 
different identifying assumptions. OLS estimation primarily relies on 
controlling for differences in observable factors that influence prices, 
while the RDD primarily relies on these factors being constant within 
an increasingly small geographic bandwidth around state borders. We 
believe that our use of individual store-level data for both estimation 
strategies avoids the problem of classic endogeneity, or reverse 
causality, as it is unlikely that individual retailers have an influence on 
alcohol tax policy. We also believe that our estimation strategies 
sufficiently control for relevant factors that explain alcohol prices, but 
it is possible there are still omitted factors that drive alcohol prices and 
tax differences. 
OLS 
Using OLS, we identify the incidence of alcohol taxation by 
controlling for other factors that are relevant to alcohol prices. We 
focus on demand side variables, as it seems reasonable to consider 
supply side factors are fixed across units of observation within the 
small geographic area of our study and given that we examine prices 
of national brands of beer. We are able to control for factors unique to 
retail outlets as well as factors that are unique to the census tract 
where the store is located. The store-specific factors we consider are 
distance to the nearest state border (where alcohol taxation differs), 
the type of retail store (a dummy variable for being a liquor specialty 
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store and a dummy variable for being a grocery store), and whether 
the store is a national retail chain (a dummy variable equal to one if it 
is). The census tract level characteristics we consider are the 
percentage of white residents, median income, unemployment rate, 
number of residents over the age of eighteen, the percentage of 
residents with a bachelor’s degree or higher, and being part of a major 
metropolitan area (a dummy variable equal to one if the county is part 
of a metropolitan area in our region of study: Atlanta, Miami, Orlando, 
Tampa, Jacksonville, Nashville, Memphis, or Birmingham). We also 
control for the number of large colleges and universities (with an 
enrollment of at least 10,000 students) in the county where the store 
is located. 
We examine the incidence of alcohol taxation in two ways, first 
by combining all relevant excise and sales taxes, and then, following 
Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009), by estimating separate coefficients 
for the excise and sales tax portions of the alcohol tax. As Chetty, 
Looney, and Kroft (2009) describe, separating the excise and sales tax 
components of the total tax allows us to examine how the salience of 
the tax may affect incidence. Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) 
suggest that the salience of a tax influences how the economic 
incidence of a tax is shared between consumers and producers, 
implying that the statutory incidence of a tax can influence the 
economic incidence of the tax. They find that consumers are more 
responsive to excise taxes (which are included in posted prices) than 
to sales taxes (which are applied at the register). Their results imply 
that the incidence of a tax on consumers is inversely related to the 
degree of attention (salience) to the tax. Because the excise portion of 
the alcohol tax is reflected in posted prices, we expect that consumers 
may pay more attention to it, and thus it is less likely to be passed on 
to consumers in comparison to the sales tax portion of the alcohol tax. 
The OLS estimating equations are 
 
and 
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where 𝑃 is the after sales and excise tax inclusive price of a six-pack of 
beer in individual store i and t references the census tract the store 
operates in. The matrix X represents all store-level characteristics, and 
the matrix Z represents all census tract level characteristics. All prices 
and tax amounts are measured in dollars, so that the coefficients can 
be interpreted as the dollar change in retail price for a US$1 change in 
tax. 
In equation (1), we are interested in the size of the β1 
coefficient. If β1 equals one, alcohol taxes are completely passed 
through to consumers; if β1 is less than one, then consumers do not 
bear the full burden of the tax, and the coefficient size represents the 
share of tax paid by consumers. It is also possible that β1 is greater 
than one, implying that alcohol taxes are ‘‘overshifted’’ to consumers, 
or that β1 is less than zero, implying that alcohol taxes are 
‘‘overshifted’’ to producers. 
In equation (2), we test whether β1 = β2 (i.e., if the incidence of 
excise and sales taxes is the same). It is less common in previous 
work to separately identify the incidence of excise and sales taxes. In 
regard to the alcohol literature, only Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) 
and Carbonnier (2013) have analyzed how differences between ad 
valorem and excise (per unit) taxes differentially impact this market. 
Carbonnier (2013) finds that the change in prices due to excise taxes 
was significantly larger than that due to value-added taxes in the 
French market for alcohol. Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) find that 
alcohol excise taxes negatively affect beer consumption, but sales 
taxes have no economic or statistically significant effect on beer 
consumption. 
The primary identifying assumptions in equations (1) and (2) 
are that there are no omitted variables that are correlated with both 
price and alcohol taxation and that retail prices do not influence 
alcohol tax policies. We believe these assumptions are reasonable at 
the retail store level after controlling for the store characteristics and 
the census tract   level demand-side variables we specify. We perform 
several robustness checks after our main results to account for other 
alcohol regulations in our area of study. 
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Regression Discontinuity Design 
State alcohol taxes change abruptly at borders, but other 
factors driving consumer demand are unlikely to follow the abrupt 
pattern that alcohol taxes do, making the RDD a potentially attractive 
method for estimating tax incidence. We use the abrupt change in 
alcohol tax policy along the AL–GA–TN border and the AL–GA–FL 
border as an alternative to our OLS estimation strategy to estimate 
incidence. The idea behind the RDD is to test for a discontinuous 
change in alcohol prices at the state border where alcohol taxes 
change abruptly but to limit the bandwidth around this area to supress 
the influence of unobservable variables on price. The primary 
assumption behind the RDD is that unobservable factors should be 
similar on either side of the border for retailers within a small 
bandwidth of the border. Although we cannot test what happens to 
unobservable factors at state borders, we do examine the continuity of 
observable factors at state borders in the RDD robustness section, as 
suggested in Lee and Lemieux (2010). 
We create a dummy variable (High Excise Tax) to indicate 
location near the border on the higher excise tax side (locations in TN 
near the TN–AL–GA border and locations in AL and GA near the FL–
AL–GA border). We treat AL and GA as one side of the border in both 
cases, because the excise tax is nearly identical in these states 
(US$0.57 per six-pack in GA and US$0.59 per six-pack in AL). The 
RDD will only work for estimating the incidence of the excise portion of 
the tax, as it is that part of the tax, which changes abruptly at the 
state border. Sales tax rates differ across cities, counties, and states in 
our sample but only change modestly at the borders we examine.4 The 
RDD specification is 
 
where distance is miles from individual store 𝑖 to the border where the 
excise tax switches. We include fixed effects (CP) for each county pair 
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( 𝑗 ) to control for the longitudinal position along each border as well as    
the census tract demographic information in some specifications. 𝑏 is 
the  bandwidth  on either  side  of  the border where stores  are 
included in the estimation, and 𝑁 is the order of polynomial of the 
control function, which shows the relationship between price  and  
distance  to  the state border moving toward the border. We estimate 
equation (3) using the excise tax inclusive price of a six-pack of beer 
as the dependent variable. 
We are interested in the β1 coefficient, which in the RDD 
specification describes the discontinuous change in alcohol prices that 
occurs at the border where tax policy changes. We compare the β1 
coefficients in equation (3) with the tax difference between the states 
to determine incidence. At the TN– GA–AL border, the alcohol tax 
increases by US$0.27 moving into TN from GA and by US$0.25 moving 
into TN from AL. At the FL–GA–AL border, alcohol taxes increase by 
US$0.30 moving into GA from FL and by US$0.32 moving into AL from 
FL. The weighted average (by the number of stores in our sample 
nearest each border) change in excise tax moving into the high tax 
state is US$0.28. 
Table 1 shows the average sales tax (measured in percentage 
points) imposed on stores in our sample located in the border counties 
of each state, along the borders where we estimate the RDD. The 
major difference in sales tax is between TN and GA, with TN showing a 
higher average sales tax at the border. TN also has a higher alcohol 
tax, so to the extent that sales taxes are passed on to consumers, this 
difference should be reflected in a larger price drop going into GA and 
may possibly bias our results toward finding more of the incidence of 
the alcohol tax falling on  consumers. 
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Table 1. Sales Tax Differential at State Border. 
 
Note: Sales tax rates reflect all city, county, and state sales taxes that apply to 
alcohol. The mean is given for all store observations residing in counties along each 
state border listed. AL = Alabama; FL = Florida; GA = Georgia; TN = Tennessee. 
Data, Selection, and Summary Statistics 
Our primary source of data is telephone surveys of alcohol 
retailers in our study area. We use Internet searches 
(yellowpages.com and google.com) to generate  a  list  of  alcohol  
retailers  in  this  area,  searching  for  ‘‘grocery,’’ ‘‘convenience,’’ and 
‘‘liquor’’ stores across the geographic region. We also use Google Maps 
to search for locations near the border of the states in our sample. 
When contacting stores, we use a standard script, requesting 
information on the posted price for a six-pack of twelve-ounce Bud 
Light cans and a six-pack of twelve-ounce Miller Lite cans. We then 
verify that the price reported did not include sales tax. 
We generate a list of 4,314 different retail stores to request 
price information, 2,114 provided price information on at least one of 
the products we requested. We collect price data from stores over a 
thirteen-week period, during which time there were no changes in 
alcohol or sales taxes in the area of study. The majority of stores for 
which we are not able to obtain price information simply stated that 
they did not sell alcohol (836). All of these are grocery or convenience 
stores in our searches. We are not able to obtain information from 
other stores we contacted because no one answered the phone call 
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after three attempts (434), the listed phone number was incorrect or 
disconnected (369), or the clerk actively refused to offer price 
information (173). We deem 34 responses unreliable based on our 
judgment of how 
Table 2. Selection in Price Data Refusal to Offer Price Information. 
 
Note: Standard errors clustered at city level in parentheses. The number of 
observations reflects the loss of observations from stores where we do not have city or 
county location. All of these were from stores in the sample that either did not answer 
the phone or had a disconnected line. 
store clerks responded, and research assistants do not code a specific 
reason for non-response in 354 cases, most of which are the result of 
an incorrect or disconnected phone number. 
The issue of sample selection may come into play if refusing to 
report price is correlated with both the actual price of the product and 
alcohol or sales taxes in an area. To address this issue, we estimate a 
model of refusal as a function of the tax parameters (sales and 
alcohol), as shown in equation (4): 
 
where R varies at the store level and is equal to 1 if a store actively 
refused to give price information and equal to 0 otherwise. Excise 
taxes differ at the state level, s, and sales taxes differ at the state, city 
(c), and county (o) level. Table 2 shows the results of estimating 
equation (4) using sales tax and excise tax separately and jointly. 
These models all show that tax rates are not a meaningful determinant 
of refusal. We are therefore not concerned that our sample is biased 
by a correlation between prices, refusal, and tax rates. 
Table 3 shows summary statistics for the retail stores that we 
have price data on and appear in our sample. We have the largest 
sample of stores from GA (34.6 percent) and the smallest sample from 
TN (15.9 percent). In terms of the store type, convenience stores 
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make up the largest proportion (38.3 percent), followed by liquor 
(35.3 percent) and grocery stores (26.4). Census tracts in our sample 
have majority white residents (53.8 percent), although the large 
standard deviation shows that we have a mix of racial groups in the 
census tracts in our sample. The average unemployment rate is (10.5 
percent) higher than the national average at the time (9.5 percent). 
Census tract level control variables are obtained from the Brown 
University Longitudinal Data Base (2010). 
Table 3. Sample Characteristics. 
 
Note: Store-level data are author collected using yellow pages and Google Internet 
searches. Census tract level data are from the 2010 Census and American Community 
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Survey accessed through the Brown University Longitudinal Tract Data Base at 
http://www.s4.brown.edu/ us2010/Researcher/Bridging.htm. 
Alcohol Tax Incidence Estimates 
OLS—Combining Sales and Excise Tax 
Table 4 shows the estimation results for equation (1) using 
separate regressions for the two products and for specifications with 
store-level and census tract level control variables. The first three 
columns show results for Bud Light prices, and columns (4) to (6) 
show results for Miller Lite prices. The positive sign on all of the Total 
Table 4. Tax Incidence Estimates: Excise and Sales Tax Combined. 
 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at city level in parentheses. 
*p < .1.                                                                                                                 
**p < .05.                                                                                                         
***p < .01. 
Tax coefficients suggests that prices rise with the amount of the tax. 
The magnitude of the results generally shows that while some of the 
alcohol tax is passed on to consumers, the majority of the tax is borne 
by retailers. The results show that for a US$1 increase in alcohol 
taxes, prices will rise by between US$0.11 and US$0.53, or that 
consumers pay between 11 percent and 53 percent of the total alcohol 
tax. These results are statistically significant at the 1 percent level for 
all Miller Lite regressions but only marginally statistically significant for 
one Bud Light regression. 
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The biggest difference in the results is between brands of beer. 
In the specifications using Bud Light prices, consumers pay between 
11 percent and 26 percent of the total alcohol tax. In the specifications 
using Miller Lite prices, consumers pay between 34 percent and 53 
percent of the total alcohol tax. We reestimated our regressions using 
a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model to obtain the proper 
covariance matrix between Bud and Miller prices so that we could test 
whether the levels of pass- through were statistically different from 
each other. Using a chi-square test with the SUR results confirms that 
the Bud and Miller Lite pass- through results are statistically different 
from each other. Because these   are both national brands, it is 
doubtful that supply elasticities differ enough to make measurable 
differences in incidence. It seems more likely that demand for Miller 
Lite is more inelastic than the demand for Bud Light in the region, 
possibly due to differences in regional preferences or advertising. 
These estimates are generally smaller in magnitude compared 
to previous estimates in the literature. Most previous studies find 
alcohol excise taxation is overshifted onto consumers. For instance, 
Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2002) use multistate variation in alcohol 
excise taxation and prices over time as a means to identify the 
incidence of the excise tax. Their estimates indicate a US$1 excise tax 
increase on beer increases prices by US$1.71. Barzel (1976) also finds 
overshifting of taxes on consumers in the market for alcohol. Kenkel 
(2005) uses phone surveys  just before and one year after a onetime 
alcohol excise tax increase in Alaska to measure the degree of pass-
through  for  excise  taxes.  He finds a wide range of tax incidence 
estimates for beer showing average excise tax pass-through rates 
between —0.848 and 4.26 for eight different types of beer products. 
Carbonnier (2013) finds alcohol excise taxes are overshifted onto 
consumer prices by as much as three times the per unit tax. 
OLS—Separating Sales and Excise Tax 
Table 5 shows the estimation results for equation (2), which 
separates the sales and excise portions of the alcohol tax into different 
variables. This allows us to examine the incidence of each portion of 
the tax, each of which may have different salience for consumers. The 
results in table 5 show that the excise and sales tax portions of the 
alcohol tax have different levels of pass-through. We easily reject the 
null hypothesis that β1 = β2 for every specification. Perhaps most 
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intriguing is that the results show negative pass-through to consumers 
for the alcohol excise tax, while sales taxes are passed through to 
consumers to some degree. 
The magnitude and statistical significance of negative pass-
through to consumers is quite consistent across brands and robust to 
the inclusion of store and census tract level control variables. The 
results suggest that for a US$1 increase in the alcohol excise tax 
(which is reflected in posted prices and highly visible to consumers), 
retail prices decline by between US$0.11 and US$0.15. The negative 
pass-through result is statistically significant at the 1 percent level in 
all specifications. The level of pass-through for sales taxes is larger 
than the estimates for the combined tax. Between 40 percent and 45 
percent of the sales tax on alcohol is passed through to consumers. 
Negative pass-through to consumers is rare in the literature   on 
alcohol tax incidence. The only other finding of negative pass-through 
of which we are aware is for Busch beer by Kenkel (2005). Besley and 
Rosen (1999) also find some of the evidence of negative pass-through 
rates on retail products for sales taxes. 
A possible explanation for negative pass-through to consumers 
is that consumers overreact to the excise tax. As explained in Chetty, 
Looney, and Kroft (2009), it is possible to have negative pass-through 
if product demand is more sensitive to a price increase caused by 
taxes than an equivalent price increase caused by other factors (a 
general price increase). Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) summarize 
the role of attention or salience in tax incidence in equation form, 
where the incidence on consumers is from Chetty, Looney, and Kroft 
(2009, 1168): 
 
where q and p represent price and quantity, 𝜀𝑆,𝑝 is a standard price 
elasticity of supply, and 𝜀𝐷,𝑞|𝑝  represents the price elasticity of demand 
evaluated at a given price and tax amount. The parameter θ 
represents tax salience or the amount of attention that consumers pay 
to a tax increase relative to an equivalent price increase. A θ less than 
one indicates that consumers react less to a tax increase than a 
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general price increase, while a value of θ greater than one means 
consumers react more strongly. 
 For a perfectly inelastic supply curve (𝜀𝑆,𝑝 = 0), the incidence of a 
tax on consumers will be negative if consumers react to a change in 
the price caused by a tax increase more strongly than they do a 
general price increase, or if θ is greater than one. Our empirical results 
can be interpreted as consumer’s overreaction to the excise tax, 
resulting in a value for θ between 1.11 and 1.15 for a perfectly 
inelastic supply curve. As supply becomes more elastic, the 
corresponding θ that would produce overshifting on to producers 
Table 5. Tax Incidence Estimates: Excise and Sales Tax Separated. 
 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at city level in parentheses. 
*p < .1.                                                                                                                 
**p < .05.                                                                                                         
***p < .01. 
would need to be proportionally larger than one, for any given demand 
elasticity value. Given recent estimates of beer demand elasticity in 
Wagenaar, Salois, and Komro (2009) of -0.46, combined with our 
empirical estimates and a modest supply elasticity of 0.1, our results 
imply a θ between 1.35 and 1.40.5 
Although our empirical results may seem somewhat 
counterintuitive without considering salience, and they are relatively 
new to the literature on tax incidence, we believe there are several 
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reasons why they are plausible in the environment we study. First, we 
are examining prices at individual retailers in a relatively compact 
geographic area, not state-level averages as is typical in the literature. 
Consumers are likely to be well aware of tax and price differentials in 
this setting and can easily travel to retail outlets in other states. 
Second, retail outlets may have large cross-price elasticities for their 
products, and, if customers are particularly sensitive to (posted) beer 
prices, then sellers may keep them low to maintain sales of other 
products with higher-profit margins. Last, consumers may be uniquely 
sensitive to the product (beer) and brands (Miller and Bud) that we 
examine due to the amount of advertising (in store, television, radio, 
etc.) they are exposed to. We expect that, if the compact geographic 
area of the stores in our sample is important for our estimates, then 
the RDD will produce even larger estimates of negative pass-through. 
An alternative explanation to the salience of the tax is that 
negative pass-through is generated through a market structure other 
than perfect competition. Dutkowsky and Sullivan (2014) explore how 
a model of monopolistic competition can produce either overshifting or 
negative pass-through. The magnitude and direction of tax incidence 
in their model depends not only on the elasticities but also on cost-
shifting factors for firms. The assumptions used by Dutkowsky and 
Sullivan (2014) relate to goods sold by the individual retail outlet so 
that their model appears to be an appropriate one to use as an 
alternative explanation with our data. 
RDD 
Table 6 shows RDD estimation results for equation (3) using 
linear and quadratic control functions, and each product price as the 
dependent variable separately. These equations use the excise tax 
inclusive price as the dependent variable, as it is the excise tax that 
changes abruptly at a state border and not the sales tax. RDD 
estimation shows an even larger rate of negative pass-through than 
OLS estimation, as shown in Table 6. The coefficients are not directly 
comparable to those in table 5, as the RDD estimate is the price effect 
of crossing the border, not for a US$1 increase in tax as in the OLS 
results. To interpret the RDD coefficients, they need to be compared to 
the tax change that occurs at the state border (moving from the low 
tax to the high tax side, as equation [3] is set up to do). The average 
tax change at borders in our sample (FL into GA or AL and GA/AL into 
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TN) is US$0.28. Therefore, the coefficients in table 6 show the posted 
price change for an excise tax increase of US$0.28. For example, the 
specification using Bud Light prices with a linear control function, 
estimated without controls, using a bandwidth of ten miles around the 
border shows a price drop of US$0.20 (0.198) moving into the high 
tax state. This implies that the alcohol tax has a negative pass-through 
rate of 72.8 percent, which equates to a value for consumer 
overreaction, θ in the Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) model, of 
1.728 (for perfectly elastic supply), or a θ of 2.1 using the Wagenaar, 
Salois, and Komro (2009) demand elasticity and a supply elasticity of 
0.1. 
The estimates in table 6 all suggest much higher levels of pass-
through and consumer overreaction to excise taxes than the OLS 
results, although these results are somewhat sensitive when using the 
ten-mile bandwidth and to a lesser extent the choice of control 
function. Most of the estimates produce statistically significant results, 
and all produce negative results, suggesting that prices rise on the 
lower tax side of a border. 
Robustness and Validity 
Although the RDD method is an improvement on OLS in terms 
of what assumptions we need for unbiased results, there are still 
several other concerns both with that method and with our general 
sample that we address here. 
Robustness 
The primary assumption of the RDD estimation is that the excise 
tax on alcohol is the only factor changing at the border that matters 
for beer prices. We can partially test this assumption by looking at the 
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Table 6. Regression Discontinuity Estimation Results for Price Change at Border. 
 
Note: Coefficients are shown for the β1 estimate as in equation (3). All regressions 
use the excise tax inclusive price (no sales tax) as the dependent variable and include 
county border-pair fixed effects. Standard errors for no controls in linear RDD 
specifications are clustered at the state level, and all other standard errors are 
clustered at the border-pair level. RDD = regression discontinuity design.                            
*p < .1.                                                                                                                 
**p < .05.                                                                                                         
***p < .01. 
Table 7. RDD Estimates for Control Variable Change at Border. 
 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Public Finance Review, (June 2015). DOI. This article is © SAGE Publications and permission has been granted for this 
version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. SAGE Publications does not grant permission for this article to be further 
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from SAGE Publications. 
19 
 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the state level in the linear specification, and 
at the border-pair in quadratic specification, as shown in parentheses. All results are p 
values for the β1 discontinuity coefficient in the RDD regression as in equation (3), 
estimated using control variables as the outcome. All estimates include country-pair 
fixed effects and the distance control function but no other control variables. RDD = 
regression discontinuity design.                                                                        
*p < .1.                                                                                                                 
**p < .05.                                                                                                          
continuity of control variables at the border where excise taxes 
change, by estimating an RDD model with the control variables as 
outcomes. Table 7 shows p-values from coefficient estimates of the 
discontinuity parameter (β1 in equation [3]) for a variety of RDD 
specifications. Overall, the table 7 results show that other factors that 
are relevant for beer prices do not change discontinuously at these 
state borders, lending credibility to the RDD incidence estimates. 
Another assumption of the RDD model is that the control 
function accurately captures changes in the outcome variable moving 
away from the border. To explore this assumption further, we 
estimated the RDD results using local linear regression to create the 
control function following Nichols (2007, 2011). The local linear 
regression essentially acts like a high-order polynomial specification 
but uses the data to define how the function looks. This allows for the 
control function to take on virtually any shape as we move away from 
the state border. Table 8 shows RDD estimates using the local linear 
regression control function. Most of these results show coefficient 
estimates in the middle to low range of the parameterized RDD 
specifications, and all of them still suggest negative rates of pass-
through of alcohol excise taxes for consumers. The results are 
statistically significant in almost every case, with a few exceptions for 
the narrowest bandwidth specifications. The magnitude of the results 
using the local linear control function suggests negative pass-through 
rates in excess of 100 percent in nearly every case, which equate to 
values for consumer overreaction, θ in the Chetty, Looney, and Kroft 
(2009) model, over one for perfectly inelastic supply or values of θ 
over 2.4 using the Wagenaar, Salois, and Komro (2009) demand 
elasticity and a supply elasticity of 0.1. 
We recognize that any policy that varies at the state level and is 
correlated with prices and alcohol taxes would bias even our RDD 
results. Although these regulations are not the focus of this study, we 
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explore how they could affect our results. All four states in our sample 
use the same blood alcohol concentration limit for impaired driving in 
the year of our survey (0.08), and all four states use the same 
underage drinking and driving blood alcohol concentration limit (0.02). 
For the sample of states we use and the year of our data, only FL 
allowed alcohol sales on Sunday. Stehr (2007) indicates that repealing 
Sunday spirit sale bans causes a large and significant increase in the 
sale of spirits. As for the effect on beer sales, his point estimates show 
the repeal of Sunday beer bans cause an increase in the sale of beer; 
however, the estimates are much smaller in comparison to his spirit 
results and not as robust. In addition to these differences, AL has an 
Alcohol Control Board that regulates prices and entry in the retail 
market, and GA has a keg registration law. The keg registration law 
requires a purchaser to register a keg of beer at the time of purchase, 
or be subject to penalty. The keg control law in GA seems to be a 
small policy difference for the market for six-packs of beer. The 
Sunday sales law being different in FL and the AL Control Board seem 
likely to impact the market. 
First, to account for the fact that AL has more stringent 
regulations of this market, we estimate both the OLS and RDD results 
excluding observations from AL. Second, because FL allows Sunday 
sales, we estimate both sets of results excluding observations from FL. 
Lastly, we exclude observations from both of these states. Table 9 
shows these results. The restricted sample results largely confirm 
Table 8. Regression Discontinuity Estimation Results for Price Change at Border 
Using Local Linear Regression Control Function. 
 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the state level in the no controls 
specifications, and at the border-pair in specifications with control variables, as shown 
in parentheses. RDD = regression discontinuity design.                                                  
*p < .1.                                                                                                                 
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**p < .05.                                                                                                         
***p < .01. 
Table 9. Alternative Specifications and Robustness Checks. 
 
Note: Results show the coefficient on tax variables for OLS regressions that include 
all control variables, β1 discontinuity parameter for RDD regressions that only include 
distance controls, and use the nonparametric control function. Standard errors are 
clustered at city level in OLS regressions, and at state level in RDD regressions, as 
shown in parentheses. All results are for Bud Light prices. OLS = ordinary least 
squares; RDD = regression discontinuity design.                                                    
**p < .05.                                                                                                                                 
***p < .01.                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
the findings from the full sample, and we still estimate negative pass-
through of the alcohol excise tax to consumers in all specifications. For 
the OLS regressions, this result remains about the same in magnitude 
and is statistically significant in all specifications except the case where 
AL is excluded. The RDD results all show negative pass- through, are 
similar in magnitude, and are statistically significant in all cases, 
excepting the thirty-mile bandwidth case where FL is excluded. As a 
whole, we take these results as evidence confirming the findings of the 
full sample. 
External Validity 
Given that our sample is from a region of the United States that 
has many differences with the country as a whole, we explore the 
external validity of our results. While using this region provides us with 
a strong natural experiment on the border of states, reducing concerns 
of bias, there may be several reasons why these results would not hold 
for the country as a whole. The demographic characteristics of our 
sample are quite different than the country as a whole. Our sample 
includes an area with fewer whites (53.8 percent vs. 72.4 percent for 
the United States), higher unemployment (10.5 percent vs. 9.5 
percent for the United States), lower median income (US$8,000 less 
than the United States as a whole), and is less educated (23.5 percent 
with a bachelor’s degree vs. 29.9 percent for the United States). Even 
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though we consider these factors as control variables in our model, 
they may interact with alcohol tax policy in ways that change incidence 
that we cannot account for. It is also possible that culture or drinking 
sentiment is different in this part of the country; however, we know of 
no way to reasonably quantify that notion. Because of these 
differences, we can only say for sure that our results hold for the 
sample where our data come from and that future studies should 
consider examining other markets. 
We can, however, address some of the more technical concerns 
related to the validity of our methodology and attempt to make our 
sample more representative based on the characteristics we observe. 
Table 9 shows our results using two alternative specifications intended 
to address national representativeness. First, we estimate our results 
using only stores identified as national chains. We expect that 
although these stores operate locally, they are more likely to adopt 
national pricing strategies and be more representative of how prices 
respond to taxes on a national level. These retailers represent a small 
portion of our sample, so these results suffer from precision problems 
in the RDD specifications but generally show the same sign and 
magnitude of our full sample results. Second, we reweight our sample 
by the county population where each store is located. While this does 
not make our sample nationally representative, it places more weight 
on store prices in more densely populated areas, making the point 
estimates closer to what we might find in a national sample. These 
results confirm our primary findings in terms of sign, magnitude, and 
are all statistically meaningful. 
Conclusion 
Our empirical results using OLS estimation show that between 
40 percent and 45 percent of sales taxes are passed on to consumers, 
while excise taxes actually have negative pass-through rates of 
between 11 percent and 15 percent. The RDD estimates show an even 
sharper rate of negative pass-through to consumers, for many 
specifications the rate is over 100 percent depending on the 
interaction between salience and the supply elasticity. These results 
imply that consumers are extremely sensitive to excise taxes on 
alcohol and that they react to them more strongly than a general price 
increase. 
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Consumers being particularly sensitive to tax increases may be 
helpful information for reducing negative externalities from alcohol 
consumption, but this likely means a coordinated effort across states 
or a national tax on alcohol may be most effective. Our results show 
that consumers are particularly sensitive in areas near state borders, 
where they can likely easily substitute to other retailers. Future work 
on this topic might consider exploring some of the reasons why 
negative pass-through is possible in this particular market. It would 
also be interesting to consider other products where consumers may 
be particularly sensitive to tax increases, possibilities include products 
where prices are particularly noticeable (such as gasoline) or that are 
heavily advertised (like automobiles). 
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Notes 
1. Similar results are found for cigarette tax incidence, with estimates ranging 
from finding a zero effect of taxation on prices to some showing that 
prices increase by more than double the amount of a tax increase. See 
Hanson and Sullivan (2009) and Sullivan and Dutkowsky (2012) for a 
review of this literature. 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Public Finance Review, (June 2015). DOI. This article is © SAGE Publications and permission has been granted for this 
version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. SAGE Publications does not grant permission for this article to be further 
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from SAGE Publications. 
24 
 
2. Our requests for price information are for a standard twelve-ounce product 
in aluminum cans. We chose the brands Bud Light and Miller Lite 
because they are consistently ranked in the top four beer brands for 
market share (Beer Marketer’s INSIGHTS 2014) in the United States. 
3. Florida has a 6-percent state sales tax rate, and county-level rates ranging 
from 0 percent to 5 percent. Georgia has a 4 percent state sales tax 
and county sales taxes ranging from 2 percent to 3 percent. Alabama 
has a 4 percent sales tax rate at the state level. Alabama counties 
have sales tax rates (in addition to state sales taxes) ranging from 0 
percent to 5 percent and city-level sales tax rates ranging from 0 
percent to 5 percent in our survey. Tennessee has a standard 7 
percent state sales tax rate on beer, county-level sales tax rates in our 
sample for Tennessee stores range from 1.5 percent to 2.75 percent, 
and city-level sales tax rates range from 0 percent to 0.75 percent. 
4. Agrawal (2015) finds that local governments smooth sales tax differentials 
at state borders. Although sales taxes differ across municipalities in 
our sample area, there are no local governments that impose an 
excise tax on alcohol that   is different from the state-level tax. 
5. We use the supply elasticity of 0.1 from Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) 
as a benchmark. For a supply elasticity of 0.5, the implied y parameter 
is between 2.3 and 2.4. The implied y for a supply elasticity of 0.05 
ranges between 1.23 and 1.27. 
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